How redeployable are patent assets? Evidence from failed startups by Serrano, Carlos J. & Ziedonis, Rosemarie Ham
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Questrom School of Business BU Open Access Articles
2019-08-01
How redeployable are patent
assets? Evidence from failed
startups
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version Accepted manuscript
Citation (published version): Carlos J Serrano, Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis. 2019. "How Redeployable
are Patent Assets? Evidence from Failed Startups." Academy of
Management Best Papers Proceedings.
https://doi.org/10.3386/w24526
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/40299
Boston University
10.5465/AMBPP.2019.260
HOW REDEPLOYABLE ARE PATENT ASSETS WHEN STARTUPS FAIL?
CARLOS J. SERRANO
Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
08005 Barcelona, Spain
ROSEMARIE H. ZIEDONIS
Questrom School of Business, Boston University
INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurial firms are important sources of new technologies and patented inventions. 
Kortum and Lerner (2000) show, for example, that venture capital-backed startups produce three 
times more patents per investment dollar than established corporations. Although some startups 
are spectacular successes, many fail in their pursuits and are disbanded. To illustrate, Kerr, 
Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf (2014) report that 55 percent of all startups that received venture 
capital (VC) between 1985 and 2009 were terminated at a loss. While prior studies show that 
disbanded startups are important sources of human capital and learning spillovers for others 
(Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007; Kacperczyk and Marx, 2016; Knott and Posen, 2005), little is 
known about the frequency and speed with which the legal rights to their patented inventions are 
redeployed to new owners. 
It is widely assumed, often implicitly, that the resale market for patents is inconsequential
for failed startups and innovative activity that follows in their wake. Relative to tangible assets 
such as real estate and equipment, patent rights are notoriously challenging to value and sell 
(Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 2004; Gans and Stern, 2010). Even if the inventions cover 
technologies that are viable on the market, follow-on use and development can be impaired
without access to the original organization and private knowledge of the team (Hoetker and 
Agarwal, 2007; Nelson and Winter, 1982). In the extreme, patent assets could be non-
redeployable in the classic sense of Williamson (1985):  rendered worthless to third parties when 
startups fail and teams disband. In this scenario, the rights should either lapse into the public 
domain post-exit—potentially removing legal barriers to others for follow-on use—or remain 
tied to the human capital through asset purchase or co-movement to a new organization.
Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that patents sometimes retain value for reasons 
imperfectly tied to the original project and team. In 2005, for example, Commerce One, a 
software startup with patents covering protocols used in electronic commerce, sold its patents at 
bankruptcy for $15.5 million to JGR Acquisitions, a Texas-based company acting on behalf of 
Novell Corporation. Novell, an established firm in the industry, reportedly purchased the patents 
for defensive reasons to reduce the risk and disruption of potential lawsuits had others purchased 
the rights and enforced them (Markoff, 2005). More recently, LinkedIn, the social networking 
company, purchased 900 patents to strengthen and diversify its portfolio of legal rights. Doing so 
enabled LinkedIn to rapidly expand its portfolio size from only 36 patents in 2012 to almost 
2,000 by mid-2016, reportedly bolstering its bargaining position with other corporate patent 
owners (Harrington et al., 2017). Although these anecdotes raise the possibility that the market 
for buying and selling patents is potentially consequential both for failed ventures and surviving 
companies, empirical evidence remains limited.
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This study sheds new light on the market for patented inventions by exploring
what happens to patents “released” to the market when startups fail. Do the assets tend to 
retain value beyond the original venture and team? If so, which patents sell, how quickly, 
and who buys them? 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH
To investigate these questions, we track 1,766 U.S. patents originating from 285 
venture capital-backed startups that disband between 1988 and 2008 in three innovation-
oriented sectors:  medical devices, semiconductors, and computer software. VC-backed 
companies tend to rely on patents to protect their inventions (Graham, Merges, 
Samuelson, & Sichelman, 2009; Kortum and Lerner, 2000) yet, as suggested earlier, they 
often fail in their commercialization attempts and cease operations (e.g., Hoetker and 
Agarwal, 2007; Kerr et al., 2014). Selecting companies from the life sciences (medical 
devices) and information technology-related sectors (semiconductors, software) provides
different vantage points for viewing patterns in the data. The sample is drawn from all 
VC-backed companies founded in these three sectors between 1987 and 1999, thus 
providing a decade-long period for observing dissolutions and patent sales if any. The 
failed startups in our sample raised $6.4 billion in equity financing pre-exit, averaging 
$22.4 million per company.
Hand-compiling and integrating multiple strands of data, we observe rich 
characteristics of the startups and their patents, which patents they sell when, as well as 
characteristics of the buyers. We also track environmental conditions in the broader 
resale market for patents using a “patent market liquidity” measure introduced in 
Hochberg, Serrano, and Ziedonis (2018) based on the thickness of patent trading activity 
in invention classes relevant for each company’s portfolio of patents. As Gans and Stern 
(2010) discuss, thicker trading in the market should reduce search costs for both buyers 
and sellers, potentially increasing the likelihood of sale and accelerating the 
redeployment process. Similar to earlier work by Lamoureux and Sokoloff (2001) and 
Serrano (2010), we identify patent sales through transactions recorded in the US Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) Patent Assignment dataset.
1
Finally, to capture the 
degree to which the value of patents originating from these firms remains tied to the 
human capital post-exit, we use LinkedIn profiles and patent records to discern if one or 
more of the inventors acquires the patents or moves as an employee to the purchasing 
organization.
To establish minimum thresholds in redeployment value, we follow convention in 
the innovation economics literature and determine whether maintenance fees are paid to 
keep the rights legally active (Schankerman and Pakes, 1986).
2
Unfortunately, we lack 
direct evidence on the expected value at purchase since prices paid to acquire patents are 
typically treated as confidential information by transacting parties (Hagiu and Yoffie,
2013). If patents are purchased at “fire sale” prices, however, the initial purchases could 
be followed by subsequent failure to pay the escalating fees later required to maintain the 
right. Finally, to deepen our understanding of the phenomenon and reflect upon the 
broader implications of our findings, we conducted 22 exploratory interviews, most of 
which were with intermediaries who service the patent resale market (i.e., as brokers, 
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consultants, or attorneys) or supply capital to entrepreneurial firms as equity investors or 
lenders.
3
MAIN FINDINGS
The descriptive evidence revealed in our data is quite striking. Of the 1,766 patents issued 
to companies in our sample, almost 70% are sold. This share is highest for startups in the 
semiconductor devices sector, where 87% of the patented inventions are sold post-exit, followed 
by the software (74%) and medical devices (61%) sectors. The patents tend to sell quickly, 
within a year of the company’s dissolution. In all sectors, the most common buyer is an operating 
company in the same industry. Buyers typically keep the patents in force through 2014 or term 
expiration, which is suggestive of longer-term redeployment value.
Although many patent rights remain alive long after the startups shut down, they rarely 
follow the original inventors. Out of 1,203 patents that sell, less than 3% (31 patents) are 
purchased by one or more of the original inventors, ranging from 4% in medical devices to less 
than 1% in software. Among inventors with employment histories on LinkedIn, only 13% are 
subsequently employed by the organization that purchases the patents. This co-mobility 
percentage is slightly higher but still low, at 20%, as evidenced by name searches in patent 
invention records. These statistics suggest that, conditional on observing evidence of post-exit 
mobility, roughly 80% to 87% of the inventors in our sample move to organizations other than 
the entity that purchases the patents.
In summary, our descriptive evidence reveals frequent and rapid sales of patent assets
from failed startups to new owners and shows that the rights tend to remain alive long after the 
original venture is shuttered. We also find, however, that these patterns are not absolute. Some 
patents do not sell, some sell but not quickly, and some travel with the original inventors to a
new organization. In a final set of regression analyses, we therefore explore sources of 
heterogeneity within the sample that might affect these outcome variables. The regressions 
include sector, founding-year, exit-year, and patent category fixed effects and control for 
numerous observable characteristics of the startups and their patents.
The regression analyses yield several important findings. First, we consistently find that 
the likelihood and speed of sale is higher when the resale market for patent assets is more liquid. 
While prior studies in economics document this effect for tangible assets (e.g., Gavazza), our 
findings show that trading thickness in the secondary patent market is also salient for patent sales 
when startups fail. These findings add to recent evidence that the market for buying and selling 
patents is surprisingly active (e.g., Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013; Serrano, 2010) and is consequential 
for the financing of entrepreneurial firms (Hochberg et al., 2018).
Our evidence further reveals that the likelihood and speed of sale depend on patent-level 
characteristics and the presence of top-tier VCs and venture lenders. Although this latter effect 
could be driven by the selection by top-tier VCs and venture lenders of higher quality companies 
with more “sellable” patents, our qualitative evidence suggests that these intermediaries play a 
far more active role. Despite a large body of evidence in strategic management and economics on 
the services that financial intermediaries provide young companies on the road to success (e.g., 
Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2004), much less is known about the roles that these 
intermediaries play in less favorable conditions and the corresponding implications for 
entrepreneurs and their intangible assets. We hope that our study stimulates future research on 
these important topics.  
10.5465/AMBPP.2019.260
Finally, we show that even though most patents from failed startups in our sample 
become unbundled from the human capital of the original inventive team post-exit, some 
patents and people move jointly to a new organization. Within our sample, the likelihood 
of co-mobility is higher for more original patents and inventions that are primarily cited 
by other inventions of the failed venture (i.e., patents with a high share of self-citations). 
Consistent with Helfat (1994) and Hoetker and Agarwal (2007), this evidence could 
suggest that buyers find it particularly difficult to capture value from original inventions 
specific to the failed company absent access to the private knowledge of the team. Our 
findings further suggest that the likelihood of co-movement by the people and patents is 
higher for failed companies with top-tier VCs but lower for those that use their patent 
rights to secure loans earlier in their life cycles. Future research could investigate the 
trade-offs individuals and entrepreneurs face when assigning patent control rights to 
lenders and how such trade-offs shape both the mode of exit and the potential separation 
of patent rights from the inventors in the event of failure.
CONTRIBUTIONS
The study provides new evidence on a phenomenon—of active markets for 
buying and selling patents—underexplored in the literature and consequential for both 
entrepreneurial and established firms. A longstanding literature recognizes that patent 
rights are strategic assets for firms, whether as “isolating mechanisms” and “shields”
against potential imitators (Rumelt, 1984; Teece, 1986), as “bargaining chips” in 
negotiations with rivals (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000), or 
as quality signals that help secure funds from external resource providers (Conti, 
Thursby, & Thursby, 2013; Haeussler, Harhoff, & Mueller, 2014; Hsu and Ziedonis,
2013). Within strategic management, our study adds to a growing call for empirical 
research on resource-based theory that moves beyond whether intangible assets such as 
patents are valuable toward a deeper understanding of why and how such assets confer 
value in product markets, strategic factor markets, or both (Priem and Butler, 2001; 
Leiblein, 2011). If patent assets are redeployable through factor markets in the event of 
failure, it could stimulate investments in unproven technologies earlier in the life cycle 
and potentially enable entrepreneurial firms to access debt sources of financing (de 
Rassenfosse and Fischer, 2016; Hochberg et al., 2018). More broadly and consistent with 
resource-based theory (Barney, 1986), inefficiencies and frictions in the market to 
acquire patent assets provide an opportune environment for strategic gain. The evidence 
in our study underscores the importance of future research on how established firms tap 
into this understudied factor market for intangible assets and the tradeoffs they face when 
doing so.
We also contribute to the literature on asset redeployment. An extensive literature 
in economics examines the efficiency and speed with which tangible assets such as 
aircraft and equipment are redeployed to other entities when companies fail (e.g., 
Gavazza, 2011). Far less is known about the conditions that affect the redeployability of
intangible assets like patents. In strategic management, a separate body of work examines 
factors that affect the redeployment of tangible and intangible assets within
organizational boundaries (e.g., Anand and Singh, 1997; Helfat and Eisenhart, 2004). If, 
as our evidence suggests, established firms actively buy and sell patents through the 
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secondary market, it could have important implications for the scale and scope of internal 
projects. 
Finally, we contribute to a growing literature on markets for technology (e.g., Arora et 
al., 2004; Gans and Stern, 2010; Teece, 1986). Although this literature establishes how and why
patent rights facilitate the licensing and exchange of technological knowledge, far less is known 
about the buying and selling of patent rights as standalone assets. We bring new evidence to bear 
on this underexplored exchange arena.
ENDNOTES
1. The scarcity of prior empirical research on patent sales could be due to the inherent 
“messiness” of the USTPO Patent Assignment records (e.g., see Serrano 2010). In 2015, the 
USPTO released the data in a format more amendable for large-scale study, thus opening up 
new opportunities for research. Graham et al. (2018) provide a useful overview of the data.
2. To keep a U.S. patent in force, the owner is required to pay maintenance fees of increasing 
amounts over the lifespan of the patent. For large entities, the current fee structure is $1,600 
(due 3.5 years after the patent issues), $3,600 after 7.5 years, and $7,400 after 11.5 years as 
listed on the USPTO.gov website. Smaller entities pay reduced rates. Unless term extensions 
are granted for regulatory or procedural reasons, the maximum lifespan of a U.S. patent is 
twenty years from the filing date of the application.
3. The interviews were semi-structured, conducted in person or by phone, and lasted one hour 
on average. Most of the interviews were conducted between 2014 and 2017. As reported in 
more systematic qualitative studies on patent markets (Benassi and Di Minin 2009; Brassell 
and King 2013; Hagiu and Yoffie 2013), many brokers and consultants we met had 
previously been employed in R&D, business development, or legal functions within large 
corporations
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